A new Asia Times report says armed opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan has spread beyond its traditional northern and north-eastern strongholds, with activity also reported in several southern and western provinces. The development could raise new questions about the Taliban’s claim to have secured nationwide stability. However, the United Nations’ assessment indicates that these opposition groups have not yet posed a serious threat to Taliban territorial control.
Five years after the fall of Kabul and the Taliban’s return to power, territorial control remains a key foundation of the group’s claim to have consolidated its rule. The Taliban holds every provincial capital, and there is currently no conventional military force inside Afghanistan capable of advancing on Kabul and capturing it.
However, an Asia Times report by Saima Afzal argues that Afghanistan’s security picture has become more complex. According to the report, armed opposition activity has become more geographically widespread and organisationally diverse, extending beyond the traditional resistance strongholds in the north and north-east.
88 claimed attacks in 21 provinces: what does the UN say?
According to figures cited in the report, the UN Secretary-General’s September report recorded 88 attacks claimed by armed opposition groups in 21 Afghan provinces between 1 May and 31 July.
The UN was able to verify 55 of these attacks.
Despite this level of activity, the UN’s assessment remains cautious: during the period examined, armed opposition groups did not pose a significant threat to Taliban territorial control.
This distinction is important to understanding the current situation, as more attacks or a wider geographical spread do not necessarily mean Taliban rule is nearing collapse.
119 attacks claimed in 26 provinces
Citing data compiled for August and September, Asia Times reports that opposition groups claimed responsibility for a total of 119 attacks in 26 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.
These figures include claims made by the armed groups themselves. Their reported casualty figures, in particular, should therefore be treated with caution. The geographical spread of operations may nevertheless offer a more meaningful indicator of changes in the security situation.
According to the data presented in the report, the Afghanistan United Front claimed responsibility for 59 operations, the Afghanistan Freedom Front for 29, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan for 11, the National Independence Front of Afghanistan for nine, and the Afghanistan Green Trend for seven. Several newer groups also claimed to have carried out operations.
A significant shift: some activity moves south
One of the report’s key findings is an increase in claims of armed activity in southern Afghanistan, historically one of the Taliban’s most important areas of influence.
The Afghanistan United Front, led by Sami Sadat, a former general in the Afghan republic’s army, began its armed campaign this year and has claimed operations in provinces including Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Ghor, Badghis and Faryab.
In the author’s view, the significance of this development goes beyond the number of attacks. The presence of a group with Pashtun figures and former Afghan security personnel in traditional Taliban strongholds could challenge the Taliban’s narrative that armed resistance is largely confined to the north and some non-Pashtun communities.
Nevertheless, the available evidence does not indicate a general Pashtun uprising against the Taliban, nor is there any sign that the Taliban is on the verge of losing control of Kandahar or Helmand.
The Taliban’s opponents are still not a united front
Political and organisational fragmentation remains a major weakness among the Taliban’s armed opponents.
The National Resistance Front, led by Ahmad Massoud, the Afghanistan Freedom Front, led by Yasin Zia, the Afghanistan United Front, led by Sami Sadat, and several other groups differ considerably in leadership, ethnic composition, political goals and military capability.
This fragmentation could be a serious obstacle to forming a coherent political and military alternative to the Taliban.
At the same time, fragmentation does not necessarily make these groups insignificant. If multiple armed networks can sustain pressure on Taliban personnel, installations and administrative structures across different provinces, Afghanistan could face a dispersed, attritional insurgency — a situation different from its previous large-scale civil wars.
The Taliban’s general amnesty and former government personnel
Another issue highlighted in the report is the fate of former Afghan military personnel and government employees.
After returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban leadership announced a general amnesty. In subsequent years, however, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has documented numerous violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearances of people associated with the former government and security forces.
From a security perspective, continued pressure on former military personnel could backfire on the Taliban.
Former soldiers, commandos, police and intelligence officers have military training, combat experience, knowledge of local terrain, networks of contacts and familiarity with Taliban tactics — capabilities that armed opposition groups would value.
The report therefore argues that if former personnel conclude that withdrawing from politics and fighting will not ensure their safety, some may be more likely to join opposition networks.
The Taliban is not on the verge of collapse
Despite the picture of expanding armed resistance, the available data does not point to an imminent collapse of Taliban rule.
No opposition group controls a major Afghan city, and none has yet demonstrated the military capability to mount a conventional advance on Kabul. The UN also continues to assess that armed opponents have not posed a major threat to Taliban territorial control.
The central issue at present is therefore the persistence and geographical spread of armed insecurity, rather than the Taliban’s immediate collapse.
If attacks continue in more provinces, new groups emerge and trained former government personnel join opposition networks, the security cost of maintaining Taliban rule could rise.
Two different threats to the Taliban
Alongside Afghan political and military opponents, Islamic State’s Khorasan branch remains a separate security threat.
Islamic State Khorasan differs fundamentally from the anti-Taliban fronts in ideology, politics and military objectives. The two categories should not be conflated.
The Taliban therefore faces two different types of challenge: the threat from Islamic State Khorasan, and Afghan armed groups pursuing political goals against Taliban rule.
Territorial control does not necessarily mean stability
This is the central question raised by the Asia Times report: can control of every provincial capital be equated with lasting stability?
After returning to power, the Taliban dismantled the former republic’s military structure and took over state institutions, leaving no conventional rival capable of governing part of Afghanistan.
However, excluding opponents from the political system, the lack of effective channels for peaceful protest and participation, and reports of the treatment of former government personnel could fuel grievances and recruitment by armed groups.
The available evidence is still insufficient to conclude that a nationwide civil war is beginning. What can currently be observed is a broader claimed geographical reach of armed opposition activity and the emergence of new groups.
The Taliban’s key test may therefore be more than keeping Afghanistan’s territory under its control: it may be the group’s ability to prevent political and security grievances from becoming a prolonged, dispersed insurgency.
Main source: Report by Saima Afzal, a researcher specialising in South Asian security, published in Asia Times on 8 October 2026.
